Changelog

Release notes for every version. Based on Keep a Changelog.

v0.7.0

Breaking
  • •Remote shell and agent daemon removed — amesh agent start/stop, amesh shell, amesh grant, and amesh reset commands removed. The @authmesh/agent npm package is deprecated. amesh now focuses on device-bound M2M authentication.
Security
  • •Reduced attack surface — removing the agent daemon (PTY spawning, shell cipher, frame protocol) eliminates the highest-risk component.
  • •Relay simplified — agent registration, challenge-response, and shell routing handlers removed.

v0.6.0

Added
  • •SAS confirmation protocol — controller waits for target to verify the 6-digit code before adding to allow list. Prevents one-sided trust.
Security
  • •Relay per-session data cap — 5 MB maximum forwarded per session to prevent bulk data streaming abuse.

v0.5.3

Fixed
  • •amesh invite crash on duplicate device — no longer throws when the target is already in the allow list. Automatically updates the existing entry with fresh handshake data.
  • •Handshake timeout errors now show actionable recovery guidance instead of raw error messages.
  • •amesh listen SAS prompt now includes Ctrl+C hint and clearer mismatch recovery message.
  • •amesh init next-steps uses plain language instead of controller/target jargon.
  • •Install script at authmesh.dev/install for headless CLI installation.
Added
  • •amesh provision discoverability — non-interactive pairing now surfaced in listen, init, and README quickstart.
  • •Trust model legend in amesh list output — explains what [controller] and [target] mean.
  • •Pairing troubleshooting section in docs covering 6 common failure scenarios.

v0.5.2

Added
  • •Install script at authmesh.dev/install — one-liner install for headless devices.
  • •arm64 .deb package — release workflow now produces both amd64 and arm64 Debian packages.
  • •Blog post — "Your AI just wrote another .env file".

v0.5.1

Added
  • •Community files — SECURITY.md, CONTRIBUTING.md, CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md, issue templates, PR template.
  • •Social preview image for GitHub link sharing.
  • •GitHub Discussions enabled for community Q&A.

v0.5.0

Security
  • •Full security audit — 18 fixes across 2 critical, 4 high, 7 medium, 5 low severity issues.
  • •Relay redeployed with AMESH_TRUST_PROXY=1 for correct IP rate limiting behind Cloud Run.
Added
  • •Docker smoke test suite — 11 post-release tests verifying npm packages, binaries, and relay.

v0.3.3

Fixed
  • •Device ID derivation mismatch — invite and listen derived device IDs with raw base64url(pubkey) while init used SHA-256(pubkey) per the protocol spec. Existing pairings need re-pairing.
  • •Compiled binary broken — sea.ts entry point restored with all 8 commands.

v0.3.1

Fixed
  • •macOS Keychain stale key accumulation — SecItemDelete only removes one Keychain item per call; multiple amesh init --force runs accumulated stale keys, causing selfSig verification failed on remote peers during pairing.
Added
  • •Key Storage doc page — explains the 3-tier fallback: Secure Enclave → macOS Keychain → TPM 2.0 → encrypted file.
  • •macOS Keychain driver tests — sign/verify round-trip, stale key regression test, key overwrite verification.
Changed
  • •Security claims softened — "replay-proof" → "replay protection", "MITM-proof" → "MITM-resistant", "hardware-bound" → "protected by Keychain, TPM, or encrypted file".
  • •Footer disclaimer added — clarifies security claims describe design goals, not guarantees.

v0.3.0

Added
  • •Auto-generated passphrase for encrypted-file backend — --passphrase flag removed; a 256-bit random passphrase is generated and stored in identity.json automatically.
  • •Detection verbosity — amesh init now shows which backend tiers were checked and which was selected.
  • •Identity info in amesh list — new "This device" section at top showing device ID, friendly name, backend, and created date.
  • •Docs sidebar — persistent left navigation on all doc pages.
  • •ADR-010 — documents the passphrase-colocation security decision and threat analysis.
Security
  • •Passphrase stripped from memory after KeyStore creation at all 6 call sites.
  • •Atomic write for identity.json in SDK bootstrap (tmp + rename pattern).
  • •Bun runtime guard added to relay start — clear error message when run on Node.js.

v0.1.3

Fixed
  • •macOS Keychain not detected in Homebrew installs — the Swift Secure Enclave helper (amesh-se-helper) was not bundled in release tarballs, causing silent fallback to the encrypted-file backend on macOS.
Changed
  • •Swift helper bundled in macOS releases — amesh-se-helper is now compiled and included in darwin tarballs.

v0.1.2

Changed
  • •CLI binary migrated from Node.js SEA to Bun compile — binary size reduced from 123MB to 61MB (~50%), fixes segfault on macOS.
  • •WebSocket client switched from ws to native WebSocket API — works in both Bun and Node.js, removes a runtime dependency.
  • •Release pipeline simplified — 4-step SEA build replaced with single bun build --compile.

v0.1.1

Security
  • •AllowList HMAC now derived from private key material or a stored random secret, not the public key which was publicly known.
  • •Bootstrap token embeds controller public key — signature verified against trusted embedded key, not untrusted relay message.
  • •ECDH shared secret returns raw 32-byte x-coordinate per NIST SP 800-56A.
  • •File permissions: all sensitive files written with 0o600/0o700.
  • •Relay hardening: per-OTC brute-force tracking (max 5 per OTC), maxPayload 64KB, connection limit 10K, bootstrap watcher TTL + cleanup.
  • •Nonce store bounded at 1M entries to prevent memory exhaustion.
  • •Canonical string rejects newlines in fields to prevent injection.
  • •Error responses no longer leak allow_list_integrity_failure to clients.

v0.1.0

Initial release
  • •Core crypto — P-256 ECDSA signing/verification, canonical request strings, nonce-based replay detection, HMAC integrity, HKDF key derivation, ECDH key exchange. 84 tests including adversarial scenarios (replay, tamper, MITM, clock boundary, body swap).
  • •Key storage — Secure Enclave (macOS), TPM 2.0 (Linux), OS keyring, and AES-256-GCM + Argon2id encrypted-file fallback.
  • •SDK — amesh.fetch() signing client and amesh.verify() Express/Connect middleware.
  • •CLI — init, listen, invite, list, revoke, provision commands via oclif v4.
  • •Relay — WebSocket pairing relay with OTC session management, IP-based rate limiting.
  • •Protocol specification v2.0.0 with full wire format, crypto details, and security model.

For the raw source, see CHANGELOG.md on GitHub.

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